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Abstract
How do CEOs exercise control over their organizations? This question is to be
answered through a study, which consists of direct observation of eight Swedish
CEOs in their everyday work. Of special interest is to investigate whether the
primarily role of a CEO is to be a decision-maker or to be a leader. Interpreting the
role as a decision-maker or a leader respectively has consequences on how a CEO is
expected to behave. The study shows that the leadership perspective is of much
greater relevance for interpreting the behavior of the CEOs. The article also discusses
potential drawbacks of obtaining effective control by the use of decision-making. The
previously dominating view of the CEO as a decision-maker can finally bring about
an explanation why earlier research in managerial work has stressed the lack of
control.
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The nature of control
A study of CEO behavior
1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to investigate in what ways CEOs are trying to influencing
their organizations. The empirical material primarily consists of field notes from
direct observation of the everyday work of eight Swedish CEOs. From the 300 hours
of field notes, situations when the CEOs were trying to exercise control have been
identified and categorized. It's therefore possible to make a description in what ways
and by which means the CEOs are influencing and controlling the organization.
The article starts with a discussion about the importance of CEO work, followed by
an examination of two dominant views of managerial work roles; the CEO as a
decision-maker and the CEO as a leader. In the mid-section of the article, the setting
and the empirical material are presented. In the final section, the empirical
observations are being discussed in the light of previous research - both descriptive
and normative – about managerial work.
The powerful CEO, the powerless CEO and the moderate view
Numerous views, both popular and academic, have been put forward over the years
about the importance of the top-leader (Thomas, 1993). The opinion range from the
CEO as the omnipotent hero, masterminding the work for thousands of people, to
the CEO as a purely symbolic figure, isolated from the real operations and
constrained by external factors. The causes for the diverging pictures are both
political (to the extent the viewer is "manager-friendly" or not), philosophical
(whether he/she believes that social processes can be controlled by the will of an
actor) and also due to the difficulties of settling the question by empirical research.
Business press and popular books about management often articulate a glorified
view of executive work. The genre, by Mintzberg (1973) labeled as "The great man
school", often consists of books in which successful CEOs (Sloan, Geenen, Iacocca
among others) present their recipes, or when consultants/journalists try to depict
what this kind of business leaders are doing. Also in more research-oriented books
this view on management has been put forward. Chester Barnard for instance, wrote
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in his classic book that the most strategic factor for creating human cooperation is
executive capacity and that the endurance of an organization depends upon the
quality of leadership (Barnard, 1938: 282). Another example is the influential
management thinker Peter Drucker, who over the years inexhaustibly has stressed
the importance of management. Just listen to the first sentence of his most
widespread book: "The manager is the dynamic, life-giving element in every
business." (Drucker, 1954: 1)
In other traditions the CEO is regarded as a rather unimportant figure, more or less
as a victim of circumstances. Several schools of thought within organization theory
for example emphasize the importance of external factors, such as population
ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
and the resource-dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978).
However, there are strong reasons to assume that the capability to exercise influence
is not equally distributed among all CEOs regardless of different contingencies and
institutional patterns. There is also evidence of a relation between company
performance and CEO cognition (Westerberg, et al, 1997). Stewart (1982: 6ff) presents
a useful model of examining managerial influence. A necessary requisite for
exercising influence is the relative existence of freedom of choice. If not, you are only
being influenced. Stewart sees choice as "the area" between demands and constraints.
If the demands (from others) are high and the constraints many, the freedom of
choice is restricted. If the demands are low and the constraints few, the freedom of
choice is large. The successful entrepreneur, who has overcome external constraints
and is not pressured by demands from others, can exercise more influence than a
manager who is very dependent on external and internal support can. School
managers, studied by Hannaway (1989), are often examples of the latter case,
entangled in a web of uncertain tasks, ambiguous outcomes and biased feedback. In
such environments no great leaders seem to emerge. When did you last see a school
principal or a vice chancellor for that matter on the cover of a leadership magazine?
This article builds on a moderate view of CEO control and the model by Stewart
(1982) will be used for analyzing the possibility of choice. Neither can this article
once and for all establish the extent and limitation of CEO control, since it is such an
elusive matter. However, through the presentation of an empirical study of CEO
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behavior, it is possible to reproduce real situations where CEOs are trying to exercise
control. It will then be up to the reader to judge whether these kinds of action can
lead to effective control. The limits of CEO influence should therefore be more
viewed as an empirical question than as a philosophical one.
A second controversy: The CEO a decision-maker or a leader?
Several scholars have identified two major schools within management theory and
management research (Barley & Kunda 1992; Waring 1991, Wren 1972). The first
school emphasis rationality, design, structures and decision-making and it has been
located within scientific management and organization theory. Effective
management is seen as the preparation and the execution of well-conceived
decisions. The subordinates' role is largely regarded as to carry out orders and
instructions.
The second school emphasis normative control, the communication of values and
motivation. This school has primarily resided in the traditions of human relations,
organizational behavior and leadership research. The role of the manager is
according to this tradition to be a leader who set goal and visions, communicating
values and motivates the subordinates towards high performance.
The CEO as a decision-maker
Probably the first major inspiration for viewing the CEO as a decision-maker was
Fayol. He emphasized a rational view on management. The manager should be
aware of all activities, know the details but still have time and freedom to think in
order to maintain direction and control of the main business tasks (Fayol, 1949: 102).
Herbert Simon has contributed more than anyone else has for the establishment of
the view of the manager as a decision-maker. In the book "Administrative behavior",
decision-making is seen as the central activity within administration (Simon, 1947).
This idea was further developed in two seminal books within organizational theory
"Organizations" (March & Simon 1958) and "The Behavioral Theory of the Firm"
(Cyert & March, 1963). During the fifties and the sixties Simon pursued his interest in
decision-making into new areas such as cybernetics, management science and
artificial intelligence. During this period numerous techniques for problem solving
and decision support system were developed, with the purpose of making the role as
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decision-maker more effective and professional. Faced with more and more complex
problems, organizations hired staff experts to give a helping hand to the decision-
maker. Even if this in reality made the CEO dependent on his staff expert, he was
nevertheless perceived to be executing his working task by making choices on
various topics. Simon's favorite metaphor for managerial work was programming,
and therefore were instructions the natural tool for control (Waring, 1991).
The first major study of CEO work (Carlson, 1951), emanated to a large extent from
the view on management of Henri Fayol and Herbert Simon. Carlson viewed the
main task of a CEO to take decisions (ibid. 38) and they preferably needed to work
undisturbed and systematically with planning and development issues. Therefore he
was surprised when he the CEOs worked in a fragmented way mainly through
various personal meetings. Carlson considered that they worked too reactively, in a
too detailed way and that they had a reluctance to establish policies. These
administrative deficiencies led according to Carlson to heavy work pressures and
difficulties of establishing an effective control. Carlson even indicated that the CEOs
could be more controlled by his co-workers (which initiated most of the contacts with
CEOs) than vice-versa (ibid. 52). Clearly Carlson was guided from a view of the CEO
as a decision-maker when he made his analysis of the working behavior of nine
Swedish CEOs during the late forties.
Mintzberg (1973) analyzed the CEOs situation in a same vein as Carlson. The CEOs
worked in a fragmented, reactive and superficial way, dealing with current issues in
personal meetings in a vicious circle of ever-increasing work pressures. Despite this
empirical observations Mintzberg regarded the CEO as the "nerve-center" of the
organization (p. 97). He also constructed ten managerial roles which has a strong
orientation to the manager as a information processor and a decision-maker. Four of
the roles are labeled as "Decisional Roles" and being a "Leader" is only one of the ten
roles (p. 59). Mintzberg's emphasis on the CEO as a decision-maker is manifested
when he categories "Ceremony" as "Secondary" and "Negotiation" as "Decision-
making" (p. 32). From a leadership perspective, ceremonies are an important activity
in which values are articulated, while negotiation is a more secondary activity.
Mintzberg suggested the CEO to get help from a management scientist, who should
analyze and (re) program most of the routine activities. This argumentation
resembles to a large extent those of Herbert Simon.
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The CEO as a leader
The conception that a CEO should been viewed primarily as a leader has emerged
gradually. The Human relations movement, which emerged during the 30-ties and
40-ties in the United States put focus on the importance of group norms, motivation
and communication for creating harmony and productivity. At least managers who
had frequent contact with workers should try to influence the group norms towards
a larger congruence with company objectives and acknowledged the social needs of
the workers. Carlson, well aware of the Human relations school, still considered the
role for higher managers as primarily administrative (Carlson, 1945: 90).
The leadership role for the CEO was instead emphasized early in Barnard (1938) who
stressed the importance of setting, communicating and instilling of an organizational
purpose. Selznick (1957), who made a distinction between administrative
management and institutional leadership further developed this idea. The main duty
of a top leader was seen as developing, infusing and maintaining central values of
the institution. This work according to Selznick should rely on many techniques for
infusing meaning, not at least "the elaboration of socially integrating myths" (p. 151).
McGregor (1960) who with reference to Maslow argued that the manager should
offer conditions for the employees' self-actualization took the next step. The goal was
to achieve integration between the individuals and organization by creating
conditions in which the individuals best can reach personal goals by concentrating
their efforts on the success of the organization.
The view that the CEOs most important role is to be a leader has during the last 40
years been duplicated in numerous books about leadership, organizational cultures
and change management.
Kotter (1982) has made a well-recognized empirical study of the behavior of 14
general managers, and interestingly he departed from the Organization behavior
tradition. Kotter basically find similar behaviors as Carlson and Mintzberg. His
general managers spend most of the time with others often engaged in short and
disjointed conversations in a reactive mode (pp. 80-81). They worked fragmentally;
they seldom made decisions and rarely gave orders. However Kotter did not
perceived this as a lack of control and he did not suggest any reform in order to
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improve the observed behavior. On the contrary, he stated that these behaviors could
be effective and that they frequently was engaged in attempts to influence others by
asking questions, making requests and by being cajoling, persuading and
intimidating (p. 80).
Kotter argues that there are simply more ways of influencing than systematic
decision making and giving of orders. He found that the studied managers had
developed agendas, which they pursued in an opportunistic way. A minute random
meeting with a subordinate at the elevator could thus be as "influential" as the same
period of time spent during a board meeting. One important contribution of Kotter,
which is guiding the analysis of this article, is the multifaceted nature of control.
Seemingly inefficient behavior can be functional given the complexity and the hectic
pace that surrounds administrative work.
Two propositions
Decision-making and leadership are not two mutually exclusive concepts. All
managerial activities can be seen as decision-making (the absence of decision-making
can be seen as a choice) and all managerial activities can be seen as leadership in
some sense Also, decision-makers can be seen as leaders and leaders do make
decisions. But the concepts have different connotations and are highlighting different
aspects of managerial work. To see the CEO as a decision-maker implies a behavior
that are circling around decision-making processes; gathering of information,
evaluating of alternatives and giving of instructions. To see the CEO as a leader
implies a behavior focused on influencing activities, the communications of goals
and values and motivating for high performance. The differences between the two
concepts make it possible to formulate two contrary propositions:
Proposition one:
The CEO does primarily exercise control by making decisions. He/she spends most
of the time on receiving information, to plan ahead and to make choices.
Proposition two:
The CEO does primarily exercise control by communicating values and motivating
the subordinates to work towards the goals and mission of the organization.
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2. The method
The article belongs to a larger study of CEO behavior, in which a replication, fifty
years later, of the classic study "Executive Behavior" (Carlson, 1951) has a central
place. The follow-up study that covers many aspects of CEO work is presented
separately in Author(forthcoming).
The total fieldwork, conducted from March 1998 to August 1999, covers the work
during four weeks of eight Swedish CEOs. During most of the total period of
investigation (159 days), the CEOs themselves kept a diary, but during 26 working
days the author was allowed to be an observer. The observation covered in four cases
a working week and in the remaining cases 1-2 days. With some few exceptions all
working activities during these days were observed. In total the observation covers
little more than 300 hours of work.
The observation was carried through by a combination of structured recordings of
activities (for the replicating study) and of unstructured field notes. The latter, which
are in focus here, mainly consist of verbal exchanges in internal and external
meetings. The verbal exchanges were more or less comprehensible to an external
observer lacking deeper knowledge about organizational and technical
circumstances. But many of the exchanges were of a more general nature and open to
interpretation for students of organizations and management.
A second problem of the observation concerned the difficulty of keeping up with the
speed of conversation. With average skill in handwriting, involuntary gaps in the
field notes appeared recurrently. However it was generally possible to summarize
the gaps in a protocol and then weaving together the dialogue sequences in its
context. Nevertheless, due to exhaustion and lack of context knowledge large parts of
the work observed remained unrecorded. However, regretting the lack of a complete
recording from the observation, the following excerpts from the field notes still
represent "highlights" from 300 hours of work when the CEOs were striving towards
control.
The nature of control GRI report 2000:10
Stefan Tenblad
- 8 -
3. The participants and the settings
All eight participants were men and their age at time of study ranged from 36 to 66
years (mean 53 years). Five of them had an educational background in business
administration, while two had university degrees in engineering and social sciences
respectively and one had joined his industry at a very early age. Their experience of
CEO positions ranged from one to 17 years, (mean eight years).
The CEOs were in charge of companies representing manufacturing (2), banking and
insurance (2), forestry, media, retailing and energy. Six of the companies are listed on
the Stockholm Exchange and one is jointly owned by the companies of an industry.
The last is a large family business. All of the CEOs of the public companies had been
recruited internally, while the other two CEOs recently had take office without prior
experience from their industry.
The median turnover of the represented companies was 27 billion Swedish crowns at
time of study. The combined market value of the public companies was then close to
200 billion.
Some of the companies were oriented to the Swedish market while others were truly
international: Three of the companies had more than 90 per cent of their employees
outside Sweden. These companies were also growing at a high rate, both due to
organic growth and through acquisitions. The international companies were
organized in business area subsidiaries while the Swedish oriented companies were
organized functionally or regionally.
The total workload for the CEOs was challenging. They worked on average 62 hours
per week, with an individual variation from 47 to 76 hours. They generally expressed
satisfaction about their working situation, even if they could feel loneliness especially
at times when the company performance was lower than expected.
This author was surprised about how sporty and unpretentious the CEOs were. A
general consensus was that taking care of one's health was a condition for coping
with the job demands. Most of the participants exercised regularly. Activities such as
jogging, tennis, golf, basketball, badminton, strength training and sailing were
mentioned during the observation. None of the CEOs smoked.
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All but one had a Volvo as company car, typically a rather "normal" sedan or station
wagon. One CEO saw this as a symbolic message: "If you want your co-workers to
have Opels you can't drive a Jaguar yourself". Other examples of unpretentiousness
were a participant who transported his children to the day-care center in the
mornings and another participant who lived in the working-class part of town. Their
own offices were also generally more functional than luxurious. White walls and
wooden floors were the most common interior. More than once, they lunched at
McDonalds during the observation period. Despite personal fortunes of many
hundreds of millions Swedish crowns in some cases, they seemed to live a rather
ordinary upper-class life. This may be a reflection of the fact that almost all of the
participants had had a middle-class upbringing in the countryside of Sweden.
The culture of top management is in Sweden, just as the rest of the world, male-
oriented. Occasionally, it can also be male chauvinist. Jokes with sexual allusions
occurred during the observation although without female presence. But men and
women got preferential treatment occasionally. An example was on the beginning of
a management development program in an international company when a young
secretary, responsible for the practical arrangements, presented herself to the group:
"My name is Johanna Holm. I am 28 years and if you have any questions, please
contact me."
Her boss: "Are you married? "
General laughter
Someone: "Unfortunately yes"
Johanna: (flushing)
The role of being a secretary was replaced by the role of being a young and attractive
female in front of the participants, and the secretary's superior made this.
In the next section activities related to monitoring performance will be discussed.
They were numerous and were occupying a large proportion of the working days of
the CEOs.
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4. Monitoring performance
A vital condition for control is access to information about the controlled object.
"Getting information" was the single most frequently recorded activity (23% of total
working time), with regards to the nature of activities from the CEO point of view.
The CEOs were eager to obtain information about both financial and personal
performances ass well as competitors and developments in the industry. One
participant used the Internet for more than one hour per day, reading Nordic and
international business press. Annual reports from major competitors were also
treated with great interest. But in this article means for "obtaining information" about
the CEO's own organization is in focus.
Financial and operational reports
The main instrument for monitoring the financial situation is the monthly
performance report. Typically this report is compared with a budget, which in turn
reflects goals and projections about the following year. The CEOs generally
considered the budget to be an important instrument of control and they wanted to
commit their subordinates towards ambitious financial goals. When negative
deviations occurred the subordinate managers were expected to bring convincing
arguments about the reasons for the deviation and also to be able to take measures
for closing the gap between the budget and the actual outcome. The ideal was to
create a self-regulating system, where the subordinates becomes guardian of their
own financial performance:
We have a very fast accounting system. In eight days we have a monthly
performance report. It's very good because is there a problem one month which also
appears the following month, then they know I will be calling them. So actually, you
don't have to interfere much, it regulates itself. (CEO of an international company)
In three companies, benchmarking over financial performance was used extensively.
The main purpose of benchmarking was to create a will of improvement and a
competitive spirit among the units. In one company the unit managers eagerly
wanted to see the results of the latest benchmarking, hoping that their unit had
bettered its relative position within the group.
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Judging managers' performance informally
One of the most frequent techniques for gaining control was to get information about
how well other persons in the organization were doing. These situations, when the
CEOs were requesting opinions about other managers, occurred in many different
settings; during breaks, lunches, travels, recruitment activities, management training,
budget follow-up meetings and during development talks. The excerpts given below
exemplify the three last categories.
After a module in a management development program at an international
manufacturing company, the CEO and his chief financial officer summed up their
impressions about the participants:
CEO: "Is Donald someone who is heading for top management? I am not sure about
that."
CFO: "He is somewhat controversial. And he can be loutish."
CEO: "They seem to be a good crowd, but different. Not many have been near the
machines during the last few years."
CFO: "I think they are good individuals. I talk to Paul, goddamn how intensively he
was listening, and he had a hell a lot of good ideas. But Barthes seems to be more
sluggish."
CEO: "Yes, I think so too."
In another international manufacturing company I was attending a budget follow-up
meeting for the sales units. No figures were mentioned during the meeting. The
discussion instead circled about whether the responsible manager were trustworthy
and capable for the task of meeting the financial objectives:
CEO: "How about Canada?"
Marketing manager (MM): "He will probably manage. But the targets are not high."
CEO: "He is a yellow-belly. (...) In US there are problems for the X-products. The
manager brings about bad explanations. Holidays, all kinds of reasons to avoid
coming out on the field."
MM: "He hasn't been out because he had problems at home."
Divisional head: "But that problem has been resolved."
MM: "Yes. His wife has left him now."
CEO: "We have to let him put together an action plan, which the board has to follow
up.  [...] Brazil does not look good."
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MM: "He complains like hell how tough it is. But he always does that."
CEO: "Whiner. What about South Africa?"
Divisional head: "It is awful. Bob has sent my some articles about the economic
crises."
CEO: "They usually do that when things go bad. It's called cover your ass."
MM - But the situation is really bad. Hospitals are being closed down."
The meeting continued in this vein for more than one hour. The corporate morality in
this setting can be described as "You are what you deliver!". And martial problems
shall not interfere with the commitment to the budget.
In a service company I was attending a development/appraisal talk with the CEO
and the finance manager. The meeting mainly was supposed to concern mutual
feedback about the cooperation between the two, but this topic was accomplished in
a minute. Instead the meeting was focussing on the financial manager's opinion
about the other members of the top management team and the subordinates within
the finance function:
CEO: "What about the units you are cooperating with?"
Finance manager (FM): Concerning the southern region, there is no problem,
however it's a little thin of competence around the director. Then Jan in region East.
I know him well and it's important that he has good co-workers.
CEO: "How is Jan doing. It is important that it goes right. He has a large operation."
FM: "Jan is dependent on good co-workers."
CEO: "Why do you keep saying so? Is that a way of saying that he is not a good
manager?"
FM: "He is not 100% in his judgements. I noticed that already when I worked with
him. Then Lars in the Western region is the one who I trust the most. Enormously
judicious."
CEO: "I'm very pleased to hear that."
The "development talk" took 40 minutes. During this activity the financial manager
assessed over 20 managers. Together with talks with the other members of the top
management team, the CEO got good knowledge of who respects whom and was
able to compare his own impressions with collegial impressions.
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Meetings and field visits
In contrast to financial reports and informal judgements, this category concerns "live"
activities of great informational value for the CEO. In average the CEO spent more
than 14 hours a week on meetings with subordinate managers and nearly five hours
a week on field visits and meetings with personnel. The CEOs generally wanted to
create a personal opinion of promising young managers and of middle managers.
Meetings with subordinate managers both reveal information about different units
and of the managers themselves.
A problem however in meetings with CEO presence was often a lack of critical and
constructive discussions. In many settings, the subordinate participants were eagerly
demonstrating their loyalty to the CEO by conforming to his argument. The problem
arises primarily when judgements are requested. The question "What do you guys
think? ", seldom led to something else than concurring statements. Exceptions from
this rule were mainly conversations with a few members of the "inner circle" of the
CEO.
In one company, an attempt to acquire a Nordic competitor was conducted during
the observation period. During the bimonthly group-management meeting the CEO
presented the deal. He received only joyous acclamation.
CEO: "...To conclude, this deal represents one of the last opportunities to acquire a
midsize competitor in this country. After that, there is only the big players left.
What are your opinions?"
Manager 1: "There is large confidence for our way of doing business and this
goodwill will help us succeed in this deal."
Manager 2: "It must be the right way."
Manager 3: "Nobody can question our competence in this area."
Manager 4: "Are we not already viewed as a domestic company (in the country in
question)"
CEO: Are some of you guys prepared to move there?
Silence
CEO: "It is a challenging task. We will discuss the position with John. What do you
think?"
Manager 5: "He is stable."
Manager 2: "He knows the market very well and is at his best age."
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Manager 6: "He is a suitable candidate."
The effort to acquire the competitor failed. The Board viewed it as a hostile takeover
and a white knight was invited. The outcome may have been different if a more
constructive discussion had taken place in the management group about possible
reactions from the targeted company and from competitors.
A second excerpt comes from a recruitment interview for a position as an assistant
project-leader for a business development team. After the meeting the administrative
manager, the project leader and an external consultant in hierarchical order connect
their opinions to those of the CEO:
The candidate leaves the room.
CEO: "I think this will be good. And she is a fanatic of structure."
Administrative manager: "l think this is going to be very good."
Project leader: "This will be good."
Administrative manager: "She had the right attitude, did you notice that?"
External consultant: "She has straight hair. The straighter the hair is, the more
structured one is." (The consultant had a crew cut).
In a group discussion one CEO justified a frequent use of field visits with the
opportunity to obtain more "direct" information about the organization. Front-line
personnel and supervisors are not involved in the "political" power game that
flourishes higher up in managerial hierarchies. Especially the CEOs of companies
organized in branches conducted many field visits. The awareness that the CEO had
a good knowledge of operational conditions probably makes the subordinate
managers more cautious towards efforts to deceive the CEO.
The use of informal chats as a control technique has also been noted by Munro (1999)
in a study of control in a financial company. He interprets seemingly neutral and
general conversation between senior managers and ordinary employees as crucial
measurements of employee morale. This may also be an explanation of the use of
informal judgements. But I will also emphasis that the CEOs do not considered the
financial reports and meetings with the directly reporting managers to display the
whole picture. This information is molded in order to show loyalty to the CEO and
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the competence of the subordinate managers. Negative information is thus often
filtered away or downplayed.
5. Influencing the organization
It is to be assumed that a major reason for getting information about financial and
personal performance is to establish a foundation for influencing activities. Not even
the CEOs of the most successful companies were satisfied with the present state-of
affairs, they still believed the company could improve profitability, growth-rate,
customer satisfaction, and employee involvement. The CEOs therefore constantly
initiated activities to influence the organization. Three major means of influencing,
identified in the empirical material, will be presented here: Communication of
values, influencing through decision making and giving of orders, and finally reward
and punishment activities.
Communication of values
16% of the total working time (i. e. ten hours a week) was categorized under the label
informing and advising. Even if some of these activities concerned informing about
conditions in a neutral way, the "information" conveyed by the CEOs mainly had an
ideological touch. The information generally contained messages about a desired
state as well as about values and norms. Ideological messages (for instances
formulated as "Ten Commandments", cornerstones, business mission, core values)
were also transmitted through booklets and brochures in most of the companies. But
printed material was not considered to be the most effective way of instilling values.
Meetings with personnel, management training sessions, management conferences,
visits to subsidiaries generally contained moments when the CEOs had opportunity
to make normative statements. A first excerpt was recorded during a management
conference in which the 60 most important managers participated. In the opening
speech the CEO settled the agenda for the two days conference:
CEO: [...] We have had a very good year. Results are up 35 percent. The stock has
risen even more. We have such a high valuation because we have delivered what has
been expected, I think. When we don't deliver then our fun period is over. I like you
to remember what Mr. Johansson (a senior executive within the company) once said:
"Sales is an estimate but profits is a promise." It has become a proverb in our Group.
We all have to meet expectations.
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The importance of meeting expectations was underlined by the CEO while showing
the last OH-slide of the conference, which stated: "Failure is not an option". The CEO
several times also reminded the participants of the conference that they were to be
held accountable for the company performance and to the establishment of a shared
culture:
CEO: Our success is dependent on good communication at all levels in the Group.
We are all ambassadors. If the message from this conference doesn't reach lower
levels in the organization we will take the blame, but we also blame you. You are our
hostage now. You can only blame yourself if we don't succeed in creating a group
spirit.
A second excerpt (they could have been multiplied) derives from a visit to the
management team of a national subsidiary. The subsidiary had problems keeping up
with delivery schedules because of a high absentee rate (nearly 20 percent):
CEO: "One week a month. That's crazy. People are not sick that much."
Group controller: "It is hard to understand. You have such a great tradition. So high
numbers only existed in Sweden in conveyor belt manufacturing during boom
times."
Subsidiary CEO: "Many people have tiresome and boring jobs."
CEO: "During the bus driver strike in Sweden, a bus driver got the question "What
happens when you are sick". He said that then the 58 bus wouldn't come. He knew
that people were waiting, he felt his responsibility. It's that feeling that has to be
implemented."
Generally speaking, the content of the ideological messages sent by the CEOs didn't
appeared to be particularly unique or Swedish. In all companies a "hard" message
about the need for efficiency, customer satisfaction and profitability and that the
managers for accountable for its implementation, were put forward. In some of the
companies, especially in those who were oriented towards the Swedish market, the
hard message was complemented by a "soft" one. This message also stressed the
value of competence, good ethics, high employee satisfaction and corporate
responsibility. The soft message is not viewed as a challenge to the hard one. Rather
was by the CEOs viewed as an effective way for reaching efficiency, customer
satisfaction and profitability.
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Decision-making and giving of orders
The activities of decision-making has as earlier described been seen as the most
central activity of top management. The CEOs in this study hardly resemble this
view of the top manager. On average, only seven percent of the activities were
categorized as decision-making and four percent as giving of orders (labeled as
"Assignment of working task"). The decisions that were observed did not follow
normative prescriptions of rational decision-making. The decisions instead evolved
during sense-making discussions. It was, given the emerging character of decisions,
difficult to study the decision-making process in the companies with access only to a
working week.
The following except about a decision is from a meeting in which an Internet venture
was discussed. The meeting had an open and easy-going character, but at the end the
temperature was heated. The CEO wanted to establish an ambitious result goal for
the venture:
The CEO rises and starts to summarize the meeting.
CEO: "OK. Time is running out. We continue to work on the vision. [...] There is a
demand from the board that the local channels reach break even within 18 months.
That should apply to our Internet venture as well. Can we agree on that?"
Manager for IT-media (MIT): (Surprised) "But...have we decided that?"
CEO: "We don't have to decide it now. But is it possible to reach break even in 99?"
MIT: "I don't think so, seen as an independent product. But together with cost
reductions in our core business, it can be possible."
CEO: "Because nobody else says it, I say break even 1999. Our archive service is a
good example. Go for high volumes directly and charge full price for it. It can pay
its way already the first year."
Administrative manager: "Is it realistic to reach 12 million in revenues 1998?"
MIT: "If we can make savings then it can work. But we have to see this as a long-
term investment."
CEO: "Our chairman of the Board uses to say: If you don't take care of your short-
term profit, you won't survive in the long term."
The CEO then closed the meeting with a phrase that was to be interpreted both as a
confirmation of the decision and as a joke. Earlier in the meeting the administrative
manager had pointed out that all operational initiatives had to be contained within
the existing budget frames. The CEO then said that this was "written on the forehead",
implying that this really should be taken for granted. The final phrase was:
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CEO: "And remember this - break even 99" (while drawing a finger across his
forehead)
Laughter
The episode above also illustrates that activities of determining and decision-making
don't have to happen simultaneously. The decision was made during the meeting but
the CEO had determined earlier on that the goal of break even in 1999 also should by
applied to the Internet venture.
"Giving of orders" was one of the least time-consuming activities for the CEOs. The
most frequent receivers of orders were the secretaries, responsible for practical
arrangements and forwarding messages. Giving of orders also occurred during
meetings and telephone calls, however often wrapped up in a more gentle language
such as: "Maybe you can try to do something about it?" Saying no to such requests
requires good reasons. The power to command is in the CEO hands, but they don't
want to be seen as autocratic.
An example of giving orders comes from the management conference described
earlier. The CEO was not satisfied with the sales figure and feared that this might
effect the company's image on the stock markets as a "growth company":
CEO: A last point: Our growth was only one percent in January/ February. March
last year was a very strong month. It seems like we actually are going to present a
negative growth. This will not be well received by the market. Therefore we have to
ship out as much as possible before March 31. This is the "delicate" message to you.
 In the financial report for the first quarter of 1999 the company presented an organic
growth of 2 percent, thanks to this tactical maneuver. The stock took nevertheless a
dive by ten percent after the report, but no crisis of confidence arose.
The carrot and the whip: motivating through reward and punishment
A third important tool of influencing is the reward and punishment system. On the
reward side financial benefits are increasing upwardly in the managerial hierarchy.
High salaries are used as a mean for creating loyalty and commitment. All of the six
public companies in the study also had a management compensation program in
form of stock options. In two of the companies stock options had created personal
fortunes for the top management.
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Rewards can also be of a symbolic nature. In one company, the use of color slides
presentations were only allowed in internal meetings if the unit performed a return
on investment of 20 percent and more. During a management development program
in this company the CEO gave another example of a symbolic reward:
Mexican manager: "You mentioned that we could save money with the use of
investment coordination. I am going to expand the production in my factory and
maybe there are machines in the rest of the Group that can be used. Is it a good idea
to create a database over machinery available in the Group, which can be checked
out before we contact external suppliers?"
CEO: "An excellent idea! You will have a star in the company scorebook."
Rewards are used to make sure that the subordinate managers do their very best to
meet expectations from the CEO. If rewards do not seem to generate results, the
CEOs also have the power to give punishment. The ultimate punishment is to fire
badly performing managers. This tool place in two of the companies during the
observation period. The phrases "he will pursue other opportunities" or "he will be
available to special assignments from the CEO" are often used as euphemisms for
dismissals.
But the use of dismissals is viewed as a failure even for the CEO who maybe was the
one who recruited the person originally. The CEOs instead want managers whose
units do not perform satisfactorily, to feel a pressure to improve. During a visit to a
regional unit, the CEO and the region director drives from the airport. The
conversation circled about the Clinton testimony in the Lewinsky affair, but a new
topic was introduced:
CEO: "Changing the subject for a moment. The rationalizations plan that your
predecessor worked out in order to lower the costs. Have you fulfilled that plan?"
Region director (RD): "Yes we have. We have also accelerated the plan."
CEO: "Our Group controller has gone through your figures and he says that the
rationalizations in your region has slowed down."
RD: "No that is not the case."
CEO: "Maybe you´re right there."
RD: "But of course, there is a certain redundancy of personnel. The competition is
also very strong, even if we have slowly increased our market share."
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CEO: "Otherwise one can sometimes feel a lack of a strong culture in this region.
Business orientation and thriftiness you know. And there has been a lack of self-
confidence. Everyone was talking about how good the main competitor was."
RD: "But that time has passed. Now we have a strong self-confidence."
The CEOs can also be more frank in their critique and openly show dissatisfaction.
This was the case during an effort to acquire a French company. In the excerpt the
CEOs phones his country manager in France. One matter dealt with whether the
country manager should move to the town in which the prospective company had
its head quarter.
CEO: "What is the total cost of the company at a stock price of 50 francs?"
CEO: "You don't know! Haven't you studied the deal, then it is no use for us to
discuss."
CEO: "I will not accept this as an alibi for not taking care of the cost structure and
for you to move from Paris. If the enthusiasm isn't larger than this, we are in
trouble. You should be prepared to move to Africa if I ask you to!"
The telephone call continues with some other items. Then the CEO asks:
CEO: "How big savings are you counting on within three years?"
CEO: "But you must have made some plans about cost reductions?"
CEO: "No calculations had been done. This is so indifferent. Joakim, we can't make
an acquisition without having an opinion whether it is a good deal."
CEO: "I don't understand you argument. Maybe you don't either. You have to take
charge, otherwise we'll send someone from Stockholm."
CEO: "You can't blame someone else.  You have to be engaged in this deal. I have
felt before that you are tired and uncommitted. If I should be in a deal like this, I
would have worked night and day. Haven't I the right to demand you to work your
guts out. You are to phone me by four o'clock, and then be informed! Put everything
else aside. You don't have a more important working task than this on!"
CEO: (slamming the receiver): "Lazy-bones!"
The CEO acted out his dissatisfaction also during the next telephone call and during
a meeting two days later. In an another setting he described his country manager in
France as "a fat and lazy farmer's cat, who one has to be little cruel to so that he
understands what is required."
Intertwining of forms of influencing
The presentation of the excerpts of different forms of control can lead the reader to
believe that these are taking place in separate activities. In reality the forms of control
were often intertwined; decisions articulate values, just as rewards and punishment
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do. It also seems to be the case that they reinforce each other. Arguing for values like
loyalty and efficiency is more powerful if decisions and sanctions back them.
A situation when evaluation, setting values, decision-making and punishing took
place simultaneously was when a redundancy case was discussed. Three positions
should become two and the person least wanted was protected by the Swedish Law
of employment security:
Marketing manager (MM): "The problem is that he with his education and year of
service he can claim that someone else should leave."
CEO: "What is his education?"
MM: "He is an MBA."
CEO: "He had hidden that well."
MM: "You don't know him."
CEO: "Maybe I don't. But he is too much an 8 to 5 person and perhaps a little too
rigid. But the job may no longer be a challenge for him."
MM: "When he arrived, things were in mess and then he worked hard."
It was decided to offer the unwanted person a new position and a new salary in the
expectation that the conditions would be regarded as unacceptable and that he
would leave "voluntarily". The interconnected form of controls is showed by the fact
that the decision had the character of punishment, that an informal judgement took
place, and that the value of hardworking was expressed. No 8 to 5 attitudes should
be accepted.
The CEOs conducted many attempts to influence each working day. These
interventions seldom had the character of formal decision-making and giving of
orders. Instead they made clear what they felt was important by communicating
values and by asking questions. They expected their subordinates to work hard and
committed towards the company objectives. The subordinates were generally seen as
their own guardians of performance and therefore to do a close supervision and to
give detailed instructions were not considered as necessary.
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6. The nature of control
The empirical material presented covers situations when the CEOs were monitoring
performance and used different means of influencing. It is therefore possible to start
to discuss the possibilities and the limitations of exercising control and whether the
CEOs primarily should be seen as leaders or decisions-makers. But first a comment
about the working conditions of the CEOs in this study is to be made.
The everyday work of CEOs
The observation excerpts reveal quite a different view about leadership and CEO
work than what is normally presented through interviews, annual reports and
mission statements. These are more of the character of impression management
where the CEOs want to stand out as good as possible. As an observer I witnessed
some rather severe internal organizational problems which in the annual report were
referred to as "low demand" or "effects from the Asian crisis". Managers not being
able to handle the situation, miscalculation on public tenders, deficient product
quality, delivery problems, etc in annual reports are not described, instead bad
performance is blamed on external factors such as increased competition, weakened
market and extraordinary circumstances.
The work tasks of the CEOs are challenging. There is not much room for either
"strategic visioning", "considerate leadership" or "activities for fun". The CEOs have a
tight agenda and long working days. There is little time for entertainment, relaxation
and celebrations. Much of the work also consists of rather boring routine activities
such as transportation (on average 21% of total working time was spent on this),
reading reports and routine communication.
The working hours for the CEOs were mainly spent on monitoring performance,
communicating values and discussing current affairs. Also, CEOs have external roles
to play (which have not been in focus in the article). On average, 41% of the total
meeting time was spent on externals.
Pressures to perform, pressures to conform
Conformity in managerial work has been discussed by Whyte (1956) and Dalton
(1959) as related to group-orientation in business life (Human relations) and by
Kanter (1977) as a structural consequence of large-scale and bureaucratic organizing.
GRI  report 2000:10 The nature of control
Stefan Tengblad
- 23 -
In this study conformity can be related to high performance pressure and the
exercising of different means of control. The CEOs generally made use of their
power-base by setting high demands on the organization to perform. Especially
strong pressures are directed towards the direct-reporting managers. The CEOs
expect total commitment and loyalty from their side. A negative effect from the
strong pressures to perform is that the subordinate managers often also feel a need to
conform to whatever the CEO suggest. They are in danger of both making of what
can be seen as ill-conceived statements (if they are "wrong") and to embarrass the
CEO by pointing out that his statement was stupid (if they are "right"). To be a yes-
man becomes a way of showing loyalty to the CEO agenda and not to make either
the CEO or oneself to "loose face".
The more afraid the subordinates are that the CEO will be dissatisfied with the actual
state of affairs the more inclined they will be to "polish" their statements in
accordance whit what they feel that the CEO wants to hear. The really "strong and
powerful CEO" is in danger of becoming disconnected from the reality by the co-
workers who want to please him. This represents a limit of control; if rewards and
punishment are executed in a forceful way the sincerity in the internal
communication is threatened.
A possible solution for the CEO is to rely more on other sources of information such
as lower-level employees and external analysts. An honest internal communication is
nevertheless of great value, and it's a delicate problem of exercise control without
creating yes-men.
Implementing agendas
Even if the cognitive dispositions of the CEOs are not in focus in this study, it's
obvious that they had developed set of ideas about what's important, which in line
with Kotter (1982) can be labeled as "agendas". Common content in these agendas
was growth, concentration on core-businesses, reaching financial targets and
improving productivity. The CEOs spared few opportunities to implement the
agendas by using different means of influencing the organizations. If a CEO feels that
a certain action is in line with the agenda, then he is normally willing to act. Speed is
more valued than correctness and carefulness.
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The agendas are implemented both through planned and opportunistic processes (cf.
Mintzberg, 1985; Tyrstrup, 1993). Some activities are strictly planned regardless what
the future bears in mind, for instance the financial reporting and the annual
shareholders' meeting. Also many internal meetings are held on a regular basis such
as board meetings in subsidiaries, confirmation and follow ups of budgets and
visiting tours. Then there are events that require CEO attention instantly: An
unexpected loss in a local unit, an important employee leaves for a competitor, an
opportunity to acquire a company arises, etc. When such occasions happen, the
previous planning will be of little use, solutions have to be found fast and pragmatic.
Whether  a certain "agenda" represents the best possible way to live up to external
expectations and stakeholder preferences is a matter of belief. The "correctness" of the
agenda is negotiated in external and internal discussions in sense-making processes.
The agendas can be seen as corporate myths (Jönsson & Lundin, 1977). They can
create enthusiasm and energy if people have beliefs in them.
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Demands, constraints, and choices in managerial work
The study shows that CEOs have opportunities to make choices and to exercise
control. However their freedom of action is restricted by (external) constraints and
also by demands which has to be fulfilled. Using the model presented by Stewart
(1982:6ff.), important demands, choices and constraints are:
Starting with the demands that the CEO has to acknowledge; the CEOs perceived the
demand from shareholders to receive return on investments as very important in this
private business setting. CEOs are often fired because of unsatisfactory financial
performance and their job description is much about taking care of the shareholders'
interests. Also providers of financial, material and human resources; customers,
lenders, suppliers, employees and experts, demands compensation for their efforts in
form of money, good product quality, etc. Finally the society puts demand on the
firm to behave ethically, often expressed in the phrase "to be a good corporate
citizen".
The competition represents an important constraint for the CEOs freedom of action.
Also the CEO has to acknowledge various governmental regulations from pollution
control to diversity. External constraints in forms of institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) are also curtailing the freedom of choice in a subtler and
more unconscious way. Looking at internal constraints the available financial,
Demands
Creating share-
holder value
Satisfying resource
providers
Corporate re-
sponsibility
Choices
Agenda setting
Communication of values
Organizational decision-making
Constraints
Competition
Governmental regulations
Institutional pressures
Financial and organizational resources
Organizational politics
Possibilities of choices in managerial workFigure 1
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organizational and intellectual resources are a most relevant restriction for all
organizations. Finally, the occurrence of organization politics counteracts the CEOs
ambitions of control by confusing information channels and the existence of hidden
resistance in the organizational everyday life.
On the choice side, the CEO has opportunities to develop an agenda of objectives,
strategies, plans, and ideas. This agenda can be implemented through
communication of values and decision-making. The CEO can design the functioning
of the top management systems to a large extent through his/her working patterns,
leadership style, composition of the Executive Group, and use of information
systems. The CEO can exercise firm control over the subordinate managers, but not
primarily by making decisions, but by making sure that they are motivated to work
for the implementation of the agenda. Without consent from the management and
other resource providers the CEOs are powerless, even if they are positioned in a
nexus of control.
The power and influence of a CEO is not inherent in the title and the position. This is
dependent on the CEO actions, how the environment perceive the CEO and of
institutional arrangements. The CEO for the Media Company had to deal to a strong,
outspoken and highly unionized profession, (journalists), and was not always able to
get the last word. The CEOs for the financial companies had no such problems; their
employees were willing to conform to whatever the CEOs put forward. On the other
hand critical debates were rare, which apart from being laborious for the CEO in the
Media Company, contributed to a well-founded agenda for the company.
The multifaceted nature of control
Earlier studies of top management behavior (Carlson, 1951; Mintzberg, 1973)
emanated from a decision-making paradigm. The CEOs main task was seen as
making decisions based on systematic planning. The observed absence of such
behavior was therefore seen as a sign of administrative pathologies (Carlson) or that
the manager was trapped in a vicious circle (Mintzberg). If decision-making is not
seen as the task for the top manager but rather as a means of control a different
picture emerges. In this article influencing is suggested to be the main task for the top
manager. The activities earlier described; primarily monitoring performance,
communication of values and motivating (rewards and punishment) appear then just
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as important activities as decision-making. Exercising control by this arsenal of
means can be done in a much more unstructured and opportunistic way than formal
decision-making is supposed to be conducted. "Unstructured" ways of working does
not necessarily imply lack of control (cf. Kotter, 1982)
With the use of activities for monitoring, communicating and motivating it is
possible to delegate the decision-making further down in the hierarchy. The
managers below the CEO, knowing the CEO agenda and values can make the most
of the organizational decision-making, at least if their performance is monitored and
if they are motivated for their job. Decentralized decision-making release energy for
the CEO to concentrate on the other forms of control. The CEO control can actually
increase when decision-making is decentralized. More people are then working on
implementing the CEO agenda and the CEOs can strengthen the grip over values,
rewards and punishment.
Another reason for a CEO not trying to be the ultimate decision-maker who directs
the entire organization is that the CEO is dependent on consent. Competent co-
workers prefer not to be patronized, then they could quit or be de-motivated. In
Neustadt's (1960) analysis of presidential power, the ability to persuade stands out as
the most crucial factor in a successful presidency. Neustadt's conclusion is also valid
in this setting. If the CEO can convince his co-workers that it is in their own self-
interest to act in accordance with the CEO agenda, the possibilities of influencing are
very promising.
Control over organizations should not be viewed as an end in itself. The CEO could,
at least symbolically, expand the power of the CEO function with the better use of
assistants, as Carlson (1951: 74/91) suggests. Then the CEO could make more
decisions benefiting from preparation work of the CEO assistants. The participant
CEOs, who didn't have any assistants, opposed this idea strongly. They argued in a
feed back discussion that this would reduce commitment and responsibility of their
directors. Also it's a difficult to monitor performance of managers only carrying out
orders. If things go badly; was it then the decision which was wrong or was it a bad
implementation? Letting subordinate managers take decisions in their own area of
responsibility makes them more accountable for their performance.
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Finally, the decision-making paradigm is based on a conviction that one is better
suited for rational decision-making the higher upon the hierarchy one is. The CEO is
then generally seen as the person with the best overview and competence as Fayol
did. This is probably not the case in the knowledge-intensive society of today. The
CEO of a larger firm has no capacity to master all the specialist competencies that are
needed for high organizational performance. The decision-making can be more
"rational" if responsible knowledge workers conduct it on the basis of good
professional judgement than if the CEO does it on the basis of hierarchical power.
7. Conclusions
The article ends with the conclusion that CEOs can be able to exercise control.
However this is not primarily being done through by being a decision-maker, rather
by being a leader or preferably an "influencer" (thus avoiding the positive and
normative connotations in the leader concept). Also the prescriptive view of the CEO
as a decision-maker can explain why earlier research (Carlson, 1951; Mintzberg, 1973)
emphasis deficiencies in the administrative process. From a leadership perspective
(such as Kotter 1982) reactive, personal and fragmented way of working do not have
to be dysfunctional.
Exercising effective control is strongly related to the ability of establish consent for a
certain agenda. Being an influencer implies the use of different means of control of
which decision-making is one technique among others. The trick is to make the co-
workers feel that they act in their own self-interest when conforming to the agenda of
the CEO.
The ability of influencing can be increased if the different means of control are linked
to each other. The monitoring system should for instance measure critical success
factors in accordance with goals and values, and rewards/punishment should also
be related to values and levels of performance.
The fact that the CEOs has legitimate right to use different means of control makes
him/her potentially powerful. However, there are important limits of control in form
of demands from others and from external and internal constraints. The CEO needs
consent from important providers of resources such as employees, managers,
owners, suppliers and customers in order to implement the agenda. In this work of
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gaining influence, institutional and structural arrangements can be helpful or
something hampering.
A result in this study is also that the CEOs were frequently engaged in collecting
informal judgements about other managers and to make field visits. Given the harsh
demands on the managerial ranks, a lack of sincerity and openness in the internal
communication existed in many cases. This makes the task of centralized decision-
making even more problematic.
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